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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This is the latest appellate chapter in a lengthy 
nationwide class action in which more than 30,000 school 
districts have sought relief from former manufacturers of 
asbestos-containing building products ("ACBPs") for harm stemming 
from the installation of ACBPs in their school buildings.1  The 
                     
1
.  Different aspects of this case have been before our court on 
prior occasions.  See In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 
(3d Cir. 1992); In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1338 (3d 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Barnwell 
School Dist. No. 45, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); In re School Asbestos 
Litig., 921 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., 
Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 499 U.S. 
976 (1991);  In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied sub nom., United States Gypsum Co. v Barnwell 
School Dist. No. 45, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); In re School Asbestos 
Litig., 920 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1990); In re School Asbestos 
Litig., 842 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1988); In re School Asbestos 
Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., 
Celotex Corp. v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852 (1986), 
and cert. denied sub nom., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. School Dist. of 
Lancaster, 479 U.S. 915 (1986). 
  
current proceeding concerns a petition for a writ of mandamus 
filed by one of the defendants, Pfizer Inc.  In that petition, 
Pfizer seeks review of the district court's denial of its motion 
for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' conspiracy and 
concert of action claims.  Pfizer argues that the denial of that 
motion has caused and is continuing to cause irreparable harm to 
its First Amendment rights.  Applying the Supreme Court's 
decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 
(1982), we hold that Pfizer cannot, consistent with the First 
Amendment, be held liable on the plaintiffs' conspiracy and 
concert of action claims and that the denial of Pfizer's partial 
summary judgment motion was clearly in error.  We further hold 
that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is appropriate to prevent 
the harm to First Amendment rights that would occur if review of 
the district court's decision had to wait until a final judgment 
is entered in this protracted litigation.   
 
 I. 
 The initial complaints in this case were filed in early 
1983, and Pfizer was added as a defendant in January 1984.  The 
plaintiff school districts alleged that until the 1970s2 Pfizer 
and the other defendants had produced and sold ACBPs without 
                     
2
.  The plaintiffs asserted that "[s]ubstantial amounts of 
asbestos ha[d] been used in school buildings, beginning as early 
as 1900 and particularly during the period 1946 through 1972."  
App. 28a.  "The application of friable asbestos-containing 
material," the plaintiffs' complaint noted, "was banned by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency by December 31, 
1978."  Id. 
  
warnings even though they knew that the ACBPs would be used in 
school buildings and that their presence there would be 
dangerous.  Seeking compensatory and punitive damages and 
injunctive relief, the plaintiffs asserted claims based on 
negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranties, and 
intentional tort.  Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants had acted pursuant to a "concert of action" and "civil 
conspiracy," and as a result, the plaintiffs argued, each 
defendant was legally responsible for every other defendant's 
conduct.  See App. 264a-65a.   
 In January 1993, after extensive discovery, Pfizer 
moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' civil conspiracy 
and concert of action claims.  Pfizer contended that the 
plaintiffs "ha[d] been unable to proffer any competent evidence 
to support either a claim of conspiracy or concert of action 
against Pfizer."  App. 51a.  Pfizer stated that the plaintiffs' 
proof against it consisted entirely of the following: (1) that 
Pfizer had marketed an asbestos-containing construction product, 
Kilnoise, from 1964 until 1972 and (2) that in 1984 Pfizer had 
become associated with a trade organization called the Safe 
Buildings Alliance ("SBA"). See id. at 53a-54a, 57a-58a.  As we 
noted in In re School Asbestos Litigation, 842 F. 2d 671, 674-75 
(3d. Cir. 1988), the SBA has been described by the defendants as 
"a lobbying and public education organization" that has 
"represented its members' views before Congress, the EPA, state 
legislatures and regulatory agencies" and "has also presented its 
views to the general public through a self-initiated `public 
  
education campaign.'"  In support of its summary judgment motion, 
Pfizer maintained: 
 The fact that Pfizer began producing one 
asbestos-containing construction product in 
1964 is not evidence of the existence of or 
any participation in a conspiracy or concert 
of action.  Moreover, Pfizer's joining the 
SBA twelve years after it ceased production 
of Kilnoise . . . and one year after this 
 lawsuit was filed does not constitute 
"evidence" of conspiratorial or concerted 
activity.  Sharing and discussing information 
which is a matter of public record and debate 
in a voluntary association such as the SBA is 
neither a conspiracy nor a concert of action 
that was in any way illegal. 
 
App. 58a (emphasis in original). 
 
 In opposition to Pfizer's motion, the plaintiffs first 
intimated that their conspiracy and concert of actions claims 
could survive summary judgment because Pfizer, in marketing 
Kilnoise, had consciously chosen to follow the same course of 
deceptive conduct as the other defendants.  The plaintiffs wrote: 
 [P]fizer marketed an asbestos-containing 
product for an eight-year period without 
warnings though it had specific knowledge of 
its product's hazard.  This conduct was in 
keeping with the method of marketing asbestos 
products by its co-conspirators, as Pfizer 
well knew, without any or adequate warnings. 
 
App. 262a.    
 The plaintiffs then argued that their conspiracy and 
concert of action claims could also survive summary judgment 
based on Pfizer's association with the SBA.  The plaintiffs 
maintained that Pfizer had been an "associate member of the SBA." 
They stated that the SBA had been formed to coordinate the 
  
defendants' "legal and communications positions," that the SBA 
"had disseminated misleading information about the danger of 
asbestos in schools directly to class members in this 
litigation," and that the SBA's activities had been intended to 
limit its members' "liability for their prior sales . . . by 
discouraging school district class members from incurring more 
expensive asbestos removal costs as opposed to possibly cheaper 
encapsulation methods, and were also intended to cover up or 
continue the effects of their earlier suppression of the hazards 
of their products."  Id. at 262a-64a (emphasis in original 
deleted).  The plaintiffs argued that Pfizer, by associating with 
the SBA, had joined an ongoing civil conspiracy or concert of 
action and had thus become liable for all of the other 
defendants' prior tortious conduct.  Id. at 264a-65a.  
 The district court denied Pfizer's motion.  The court 
did not adopt the argument that Pfizer could be held to have 
entered into a conspiracy or concert of action due to its 
conscious choice of a course of conduct that parallelled those of 
its co-defendants.  Rather, the court concluded that "there [was] 
evidence by which a jury could reasonably find that Pfizer later 
joined an ongoing conspiracy/concert of action by its involvement 
with, and financial support for . . . [ the SBA]."  Dist. Ct. Op. 
at 1-2.  The court noted (Dist. Ct. Op. at 2 & n.1) that, in an 
earlier ruling concerning the plaintiffs' request for an 
injunction, the court had found that "Pfizer, Inc. . . ., 
although it is not a member of the SBA, ha[d] contributed 
insignificantly to the financing of the SBA."  See In re Asbestos 
  
School Litigation, 115 F.R.D. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated on 
other grounds, 842 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1988).  However, the court 
concluded that these findings were not binding at the summary 
judgment stage and that it should be left for the jury to decide 
whether Pfizer had become a member of the SBA and whether its 
contributions (which the plaintiffs allege amounted to at least 
$50,000) were significant.  The court also noted that "Pfizer's 
counsel [had] admitted at oral argument that three or four of 
Pfizer's in-house attorneys [had] attended SBA meetings when 
topics of interest to Pfizer were discussed."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 
2. (footnote omitted). 
 Observing that Pfizer had maintained that the SBA's 
sole purpose was "to disseminate to the public, government, and 
regulatory agencies its members' views about the proper means for 
dealing with asbestos that was already in place in buildings," 
the court stated that if this was indeed the SBA's sole purpose, 
the "plaintiffs' conspiracy and concert of action claims against 
Pfizer would fail for lack of causation" because the complaint 
did not allege that the defendants had caused the plaintiffs 
damage "by misleading them about proper techniques of asbestos 
removal or abatement."  Id. at 3.  The court continued: 
 However, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence 
that the actions of SBA . . . were also aimed 
in part at convincing the public that SBA 
members had no prior knowledge of the dangers 
of asbestos.  Thus, SBA's actions could 
reasonably be interpreted by a jury as 
contributing to an ongoing conspiracy to 
conceal the asbestos industry's alleged 
knowledge of the dangers of asbestos. 
 
Id. at 4. 
  
 
 Pfizer moved for reconsideration, arguing that the 
district court's decision "penalize[d] Pfizer's exercise of its 
First Amendment rights to engage in free speech and to associate 
with [the SBA]."  App. 325a-26a.  Citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 918-20, Pfizer added: "The United 
States Supreme Court has often cautioned that conspiracy 
liability cannot be constitutionally imposed based upon mere 
association."  Id. at 326a.  The district court denied 
reconsideration, as well as Pfizer's request for certification of 
an interlocutory appeal.  Pfizer then filed the mandamus petition 
that is now before us.  
 
 II.   
  The general standards for issuing a writ of mandamus 
have been restated many times.  As we wrote in a prior mandamus 
proceeding in this case: 
  The traditional use of mandamus has been 
"to confine an inferior court to a lawful 
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to 
compel it to exercise its authority when it 
has a duty to do so."  Roche v. Evaporated 
Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S. Ct. 
938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943).  Even under 
that formulation, however, "courts have not 
confined themselves to any narrow or 
technical definition of the term 
`jurisdiction.'"  United States v. Santtini, 
963 F.2d 585, 594 (3d Cir. 1992).  See 
Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 
U.S. 296, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1822, 104 
L.Ed.2d 318 (1989). . . .  Mandamus may be 
especially appropriate to further supervisory 
and instructional goals, and where issues are 
unsettled and important.  See Sporck v. Peil, 
759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985); United 
  
States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 895-97 (3d 
Cir. 1981); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 
810 (3d Cir. 1965) (in banc). 
 
In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 773 (3d Cir. 
1992).  See also, e.g., Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 
F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v Bertoli, 994 F.2d 
1002, 1014-15 (3d Cir. 1993); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 
F.2d 81, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1167 
(3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 
127 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 Since mandamus is an "extraordinary" remedy, it must be 
invoked sparingly.  See In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 
774.  Excessive use would undermine the important goal of 
avoiding piecemeal appellate review.  Kerr v. United States 
District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).3  In order to ensure 
that writs of mandamus are restricted to extraordinary 
situations, the Supreme Court has set forth two conditions that 
must be satisfied:  first, the petitioner must show a "clear and 
indisputable" right to the writ and, second, the petitioner must 
have "no other adequate means to attain the relief . . . 
desire[d]."  Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403.  "Once these two 
prerequisites are met, the court's decision whether to issue the 
                     
3
.  It has also been noted that mandamus now has the unfortunate 
consequence of making the district court judge a litigant.  Kerr, 
426 U.S. at 402; Fed. R. App. P. 21.  Under a preliminary draft 
of a proposed amendment to Fed. R. App. P. 21, however, the trial 
judge would no longer be treated as a respondent.  See Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Request for Comment on Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
etc., 156 F.R.D. 340, 350 (Sept. 1, 1994).   
  
writ is largely one of discretion."  Haines, 975 F.2d at 89.  See 
also Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403; Alexander, 10 F.3d at 163; In re 
School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d at 772.  
 
 III. 
 A.  In considering Pfizer's petition, we turn first to 
the question whether Pfizer has shown that it has a "clear and 
indisputable right" to the issuance of a writ.  Kerr, 426 U.S. at 
403.  We hold that Pfizer has made this showing because the 
district court's decision lies far outside the bounds of 
established First Amendment law. 
 As Pfizer contends, the district court's decision is 
squarely inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., supra.  Claiborne Hardware 
resulted from events in Claiborne County, Mississippi, from 1966 
to 1972.  African-American citizens of the county presented white 
elected officials with a list of demands regarding racial 
equality and integration, and when a satisfactory response was 
not received, several hundred persons attending a meeting of the 
local branch of the N.A.A.C.P. voted to place a boycott on white 
merchants in the area.   The boycott was generally supported by 
speeches and nonviolent picketing, but some threats and acts of 
violence did occur.  After several years, a group of white 
merchants brought suit in state court and named as defendants the 
N.A.A.C.P., a local organization, and numerous individuals.   
After a bench trial, most of the defendants were found to be 
jointly and severally liable, based on three separate legal 
  
theories, for all of the merchants' losses since the inception of 
the boycott.  The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court's holding of liability under two of the three legal 
theories but sustained its holding with respect to most of the 
remaining defendants under the third theory, which was based on 
civil conspiracy and the common law tort of malicious 
interference with the plaintiffs' businesses.  458 U.S. at 891 & 
n.7, 894-95.   
 The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  
The Court concluded that the nonviolent elements of the boycott  
-- giving speeches, banding together for collective advocacy, 
nonviolent picketing, personal solicitation of nonparticipants, 
and the use of a local black newspaper -- were protected by the 
First Amendment.  458 U.S at 907-15.  While noting that the First 
Amendment did not shield the acts of violence that had been 
committed in connection with the boycott, the Court explained: 
 Civil liability may not be imposed merely 
because an individual belonged to a group, 
some members of which committed acts of 
violence.  For liability to be imposed by 
reason of association alone, it is necessary 
to establish that the group itself possessed 
unlawful goals and that the individual held a 
specific intent to further those illegal 
aims.  "In this sensitive field, the State 
may not employ `means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end 
can be more narrowly achieved.'"  
 
Id. at 920 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Moreover, the 
Court "emphasized that this intent must be judged `according to 
the strictest law.'"  Id. at 919, (quoting Noto v. United States, 
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)). Applying this standard, the court 
  
held that on the record before it "no judgment [could] be 
sustained against most of the petitioners."  Id. at 924. 
 In the present case, it is abundantly clear that the 
strict standard set out in Claiborne Hardware cannot be met.  For 
one thing, Pfizer's association with the SBA, which was formed in 
1984, cannot possibly show that Pfizer specifically intended to 
further the other defendants' manufacture and distribution of 
ACBPs, which ceased in the 1970s.  Yet as the district court 
observed, all of the harm for which the plaintiffs sought relief 
was caused by the manufacture and distribution of ACBPs and not 
by any allegedly misleading statements that the SBA subsequently 
made concerning ACBP removal. 
 In any event, even if the plaintiffs had sought to 
recover for harm caused after the SBA's creation, and even if it 
is assumed for the sake of argument that the record is sufficient 
to show that some of the SBA's activities were unlawful and not 
entitled to First Amendment protection,4 the Claiborne Hardware 
standard still could not be satisfied.  There can be no doubt 
that at least some of the SBA's activities were constitutionally 
                     
4
.  For example, the plaintiffs, apparently referring to the 
booklet at issue in In re School Asbestos Litigation, 842 F.2d 
671 (3d Cir. 1988), contend that "[t]he SBA disseminated 
misleading information about the danger of asbestos in schools 
directly to class members in this litigation, designed to reduce 
or limit Pfizer's and the other defendants' liability exposure in 
these cases by encouraging class members either not to abate or 
to use cheaper abatement methods. . . ."  Resp. Class-Plaintiffs' 
Br. at 13-14.  If true, these allegations might satisfy the 
elements of fraudulent misrepresentation.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 525; Borelli v. Barthel, 211 A.2d 11, 12-13 
(Pa.Super. 1965). 
  
protected.  As we noted in an earlier opinion, the SBA and its 
representatives provided testimony at congressional hearings, 
sent informational packages to and met with members of Congress, 
participated in EPA rulemaking, attended EPA meetings, submitted 
position papers to and served on advisory committees appointed by 
the EPA, and participated in legislative and regulatory 
proceedings in approximately 20 states.  In re School Asbestos 
Litig., 842 F.2d at 674-75.  Thus, Pfizer cannot be held civilly 
liable for any wrongful conduct committed by the SBA or its 
members in the years after the SBA's formation unless it can be 
shown that Pfizer's actions taken in relation to the SBA were 
specifically intended to further such wrongful conduct.    
 Here, there is simply no evidence that Pfizer had such 
an intent.  The plaintiffs rely on the fact that Pfizer made a 
contribution (allegedly amounting to at least $50,000) to the 
SBA, but this fact is plainly insufficient.  That donation could 
have been specifically intended to further one or more of the 
SBA's many constitutionally protected activities, or it could 
have been given for the general purpose of helping the SBA.  A 
rational jury could not find based on the record before us that 
this donation was specifically intended to advance activities not 
protected by the First Amendment.   
 Nor is it enough that Pfizer was allegedly an 
"associate member" of the SBA.  A member of a trade group or 
other similar organization does not necessarily endorse 
everything done by that organization or its members. 
  
 Pfizer's only other conduct that is related to the SBA 
-- the fact that three or four of Pfizer's in-house attorneys 
attended some SBA meetings -- is no more probative.   Attendance 
at a meeting of an organization does not necessarily signify 
approval of any of that organization's activities.  And, even if 
the attendance at issue here could reasonably be interpreted as 
an expression of general approval of the SBA's goals, it 
unquestionably could not rationally be viewed as sufficient to 
show that Pfizer specifically intended to further any allegedly 
tortious and constitutionally unprotected activities committed by 
the SBA or its other members.  See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 
at 924 ("Regular attendance and participation at the [meetings] . 
. . is an insufficient predicate on which to impose liability 
[because the] . . . findings do not suggest that any illegal 
conduct was authorized, ratified, or even discussed at any of the 
meetings.").  Accordingly, the SBA-related evidence on which the 
district court in this case relied does not come close to 
satisfying the strict standard required by Claiborne Hardware. 
 B.  Although Pfizer's brief relied heavily on Claiborne 
Hardware (see Pet.'s Br. at 10, 18-21),5 the plaintiffs' brief 
made little effort to distinguish that case.  The entire 
discussion of Claiborne Hardware in that brief is as follows: 
 Pfizer places great reliance on [Claiborne 
Hardware] for the proposition that their SBA 
activities are deserving of First Amendment 
protection.  This argument simply diverts 
attention from the simplicity of the issue at 
                     
5
.  See also Br. for Resp. W. R. Grace & Co. at 12-13; Br. for 
for Amicus American Society of Association Executives at 9-10. 
  
hand, i.e., whether sufficient record 
evidence permitted the District Court to find 
that a jury could reasonably infer that 
Pfizer took part in a conspiracy or concerted 
action on the record evidence presented.  
Actions taken by Pfizer for which it may 
claim First Amendment or Noerr-Pennington 
protection6 are not necessarily proper merely 
because they inevitably included lobbying 
efforts.  In any event, SBA's and Pfizer's 
self-interested and misleading communications 
are not comparable to the kind of behavior 
which Pfizer points to in Claiborne. 
 
Resp. Class-Plaintiffs' Br. at 22-23.   
 
 Read generously, this passage may perhaps be 
interpreted to mean (a) that the holding in Claiborne Hardware 
should be limited to the compelling factual context in which that 
case arose and (b) that the decision of the district court, even 
if it was wrong in relying on the SBA evidence, may nevertheless 
be sustained on an alternative ground, i.e., that the non-SBA 
evidence in the record was sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment for Pfizer on the conspiracy and concerted action 
claims.  Neither of these arguments is persuasive.   
 As for the first, we readily agree that the factual 
background of Claiborne Hardware was very different from this 
case and that the constitutionally protected conduct in Claiborne 
Hardware was of much greater societal importance.  We see nothing 
in the Supreme Court's opinion, however, that lends support to 
the suggestion that the standard it enunciated was not meant to 
                     
6
.  See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);  
  
have general applicability.  As a lower court, we do not feel 
free to give Claiborne Hardware such a narrow interpretation; and 
in any event, for the reasons explained in the Claiborne Hardware 
opinion, we would not do so even if we could.   
 The second argument -- that the district court's 
decision may be sustained based on non-SBA-related evidence -- is 
factually unsound.  Attempting to persuade us to accept this 
argument, plaintiffs' brief stated, without any citations to the 
record, that "[t]he district court was aware of and considered a 
factual record that included hundreds of documents . . . showing 
meetings, conferences, letters and tacit and direct agreements to 
conspire to conceal information or not to warn among Pfizer and 
other defendants."  Resp. Class-Plaintiffs' Br. at 24.  Prompted 
by this statement, we directed the plaintiffs to submit a letter-
brief listing and providing a citation for every action taken by 
Pfizer that the plaintiffs wished us to consider in determining 
whether Pfizer could be held liable for civil conspiracy.  The 
letter-brief subsequently submitted by the plaintiffs contended 
that a rational trier-of-fact could draw 11 relevant inferences 
from the summary judgment record and that these inferences were 
sufficient to defeat Pfizer's summary judgment motion.  These 
inferences were: 
 1. Pfizer began to sell its Kilnoise . . .  
 in 1964, without warnings. 
  
 2. Pfizer learned by at least 1965 that Dr. 
Irving Selikoff, one of the world's foremost 
asbestos researchers, had found a 
relationship between asbestos inhalation and 
cancer.   
 
  
 3. Pfizer continued to sell its [Kilnoise] 
for seven more years without warnings.  
 
 4. SBA members sold their [asbestos 
containing] products without warnings, some 
for as long as fifty years, despite knowledge 
of the dangers of asbestos and their 
products.  
 
 5. The SBA members and Pfizer were aware that 
each was selling its [asbestos containing] 
products without warnings. 
 
 6. SBA members had tacitly or overtly agreed 
to continue to sell their [asbestos 
containing products] without warnings, and 
did so until government regulations were 
enacted requiring them to place warnings on 
their [asbestos containing products]. 
 
 [7]. There had been written agreements, 
meetings, and other communications among 
asbestos defendants to conceal their 
knowledge of the dangers of asbestos from the 
public.  
 
 [8]. One purpose of the SBA was to continue 
the original concealment of its members.  
 
 [9].  Pfizer was in attendance at SBA 
meetings and provided substantial financial 
support to the SBA.   
 
 [10].  The SBA materials were also intended 
to lower litigation costs for SBA members and 
other defendants.  
 
 [11]. Pfizer removed [asbestos containing 
materials] from its own facilities during the 
SBA's dissemination of materials to the class 
advising the class not to abate [asbestos 
containing materials].     
 
  
 Having carefully reviewed the portions of the record 
that are said to support these inferences, we are convinced that 
the record cannot sustain a claim against Pfizer based on either 
  
a civil conspiracy or a concert of action.  Inferences eight 
through ten relate to the SBA and are thus covered by our 
discussion above.  Inferences six and seven would be highly 
significant if there were any evidence that Pfizer had engaged in 
the activities in question, i.e., if there were evidence that 
Pfizer had "tacitly or overtly agreed" with the other defendants 
to continue selling its product without warnings or had been a 
party to "written agreements, meetings, and other communications 
among asbestos defendants to conceal their knowledge of the 
dangers of asbestos from the public."  However, our examination 
of the portions of the record cited by the plaintiffs in support 
of these inferences revealed no such evidence.  Inference eleven 
-- that Pfizer removed asbestos containing materials from its own 
facilities while the SBA was advising against such removal -- has 
no bearing on whether Pfizer engaged in a conspiracy or concerted 
action with the other defendants.  
 The remaining inferences -- numbers one through five -- 
suggest that Pfizer and the other defendants consciously engaged 
in parallel courses of conduct, but under the law of Pennsylvania 
-- the only jurisdiction whose law has been briefed and therefore 
the only jurisdiction whose law we feel it appropriate to 
consider7 -- conscious parallelism is not sufficient to establish 
either a civil conspiracy or concerted action.   
                     
7
.  The plantiffs' brief argued that the evidence in the record 
is sufficient to establish a civil conspiracy or concerted action 
under Pennsylvania law, but they stated in a footnote that they 
did not agree that Pennsylvania law was controlling.  Resp. 
Class-Plaintiffs' Br. at 26 n.9.  Rather, they suggested that the 
law of all of the jurisdictions in which members of the plaintiff 
  
 In Burnside v. Abbot Lab., 505 A.2d 973, 982 (Pa.Super. 
1985), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that conscious 
parallelism is insufficient under either of these theories.  In 
that case, the plaintiffs contended, based on conspiracy and 
concert of action theories, that all the pharmaceutical companies 
that had manufactured diethylstilbestrol ("DES") should be 
jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by the ingestion 
of DES.  The court reviewed the required elements of civil 
conspiracy and concerted action and explained why the plaintiffs' 
allegations of conscious parallelism failed to satisfy these 
requirements. 
 To prove civil conspiracy in Pennsylvania, the court 
stated, a plaintiff must show "that two or more persons 
combine[d] or enter[ed] an agreement to commit an unlawful act or 
to do an otherwise lawful act by unlawful means."  Id. at 980.  
The court noted that "[p]roof of malice is an essential part of a 
cause of action for conspiracy," id. at 980 (citing Thompson Coal 
Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 472 (Pa. 1979)) and that the 
"`mere fact that two or more persons, each with the right to do a 
thing, happen to do that thing at the same time is not by itself 
an actionable conspiracy.'"  Id. at 980-81 (quoting Fife v. Great 
(..continued) 
class are located should be applied.  Id.  They did not, however, 
brief the law of any other jurisdiction, and indeed, they did not 
provide a citation for even one non-Pennsylvania case.  Under 
these circumstances, we deem the plaintiffs to have forfeited the 
right to rely on the law of any other jurisdictions for purposes 
of the mandamus proceeding. 
  
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 52 A.2d 24, 39 (Pa. 1947), cert. 
denied, 332 U.S. 821 (1947)). 
 With this in mind, the court reviewed the plaintiffs' 
averments, which were as follows:  
 From 1947 through 1941 [sic] each of the 
[d]efendants, individually and in concert 
with each other, manufactured and marketed 
DES under various names but in an identical, 
generic formula . . . .  Although defendants 
knew or should have known of the potential 
carcinogenic effects of DES, and its 
experimental status as a preventative for 
miscarriage, [d]efendants manufactured and 
marketed it without testing for teratogenic 
and carcinogenic effects; without warning for 
such potential effects, and without notice of 
the Food and Drug Administration's approval 
for only experimental use in prevention of 
miscarriage. 
Burnside, 505 A.2d at 981-82.  These allegations, the court held, 
were not enough to prove a civil conspiracy.  The court 
explained: 
 [T]he plaintiffs in the instant case have 
failed to allege the manner in which a 
conspiratorial scheme was devised and carried 
out.  The complaint contains no averments of 
meetings, conferences, telephone calls, joint 
filings, cooperation, consolidation, or joint 
licensing.  The plaintiffs have alleged no 
more than a contemporaneous and negligent 
failure to act. 
Id. at 982 (emphasis added).  
 Similarly, the court found that the plaintiffs' 
allegations failed to satisfy the elements of a concerted action.  
The court explained that Pennsylvania appears to follow Section 
876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: 
 For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious 
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he 
  
 
  (a)  does a tortious act in concert with 
the other or pursuant to a common design with 
him, or 
 
  (b)  knows that the other's conduct 
constitutes a breach of duty and gives 
substantial assistance or encouragement to 
the other so to conduct himself, or 
 
  (c)  gives substantial assistance to the 
other in accomplishing a tortious result and 
his own conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes a breach of duty to the third 
person. 
 
 The court then concluded that subsection (a) requires 
proof of an explicit or tacit agreement8 and that the plaintiffs' 
averments were insufficient to establish such an agreement.  The 
court likewise concluded that those averments were insufficient 
to show the "substantial assistance" needed under subsections (b) 
and (c).  The court wrote: 
  The plaintiffs in this case . . . rely 
upon averments that the defendant 
manufacturers failed to test DES adequately 
and failed to give adequate warning of the 
risks inherent in its use as a miscarriage 
deterrent.  Plaintiffs have not alleged 
either a tacit understanding or common design 
to market a defective product or that 
appellees rendered substantial assistance in 
causing injury to the plaintiffs.  They have 
charged the defendants merely with "parallel 
and imitative" conduct . . . .  To sustain a 
cause of action for concerted tortious 
conduct under these circumstances would be to 
expand the doctrine of Section 876 of the 
Restatement beyond its intended scope. . . . 
 
                     
8
.  See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, comment a, 
clause (a). 
  
505 A.2d at 984.9 
 Since Burnside is a decision of a state intermediate 
appellate court, we are not bound to follow it, but such 
decisions are "not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it 
is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of 
the state would decide otherwise."  West v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940).  See also Commissioner v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Northern Insurance Co. v. 
Aardvark Associates, Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 851 F.2d 
98, 100 (3d Cir. 1988).  Here, we have not been presented with 
(and have not found) "other persuasive data that the [Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania] would decide otherwise."  We therefore 
follow the Superior Court's decision in Burnside; and applying 
the principles set forth in Burnside to the facts of this case, 
we do not see how a rational jury could find the existence of a 
civil conspiracy or concerted action based solely on the alleged 
fact that Pfizer and the other defendants consciously engaged in 
parallel conduct.   
 C.  In sum, then, the district court's decision was 
clearly wrong.  Worse, it has implications that broadly threaten 
First Amendment rights.  The district court's holding suggests 
that Pfizer -- based solely on its limited and (as far as the 
                     
9
.  See also, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 
1012-16 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying South Carolina law); Zafft v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 244-45 (Mo. 1984); Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 931-33 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 912 (1980). 
  
record reflects) innocent association with the SBA -- could be 
held liable, as the plaintiffs have urged, for all of the 
allegedly tortious acts committed by all of the defendants, 
whether before or after the SBA was formed.  The implications of 
such a holding are far-reaching.  Joining organizations that 
participate in public debate, making contributions to them, and 
attending their meetings are activities that enjoy substantial 
First Amendment protection.  See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent 
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 
290, 294-96 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-25 (1976); 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).  But the 
district court's holding, if generally accepted, would make these 
activities unjustifiably risky and would undoubtedly have an 
unwarranted inhibiting effect upon them.  For these reasons, we 
are convinced that Pfizer has shown that its right to the 
issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." 
 
 IV. 
 We thus turn to the question whether Pfizer has any 
other adequate means to obtain relief.  We have held that it is 
appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus in order to vacate an 
interlocutory order restraining constitutionally protected 
expression during the pendency of a trial.  Rodgers v. United 
States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976).  Other 
courts of appeals have reached similar results.  See In re King 
World Productions, Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990); In re 
Perry, 859 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (1st. Cir. 1988); In re Halkin, 598 
  
F.2d 176, 197-99 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 
1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1970).  Mandamus has been found to be proper 
in these cases because the duration of a trial is an "intolerably 
long" period during which to permit the continuing impairment of 
First Amendment rights.  In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 199, (citing 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1941)).  Although a 
party might be able to obtain earlier review by standing in 
contempt, courts of appeals have held that this is an inadequate 
remedy because the threat of contempt "might well suffocate the 
`breathing space' necessary for the exercise of . . . First 
Amendment rights."  In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 199; see also 
Chase, 435 F.2d at 1062.  Thus, mandamus has been recognized as a 
proper remedy in cases involving prior restraints.  
 The reasons that justify mandamus in prior restraint 
cases weigh in favor of its use in the present case.  Pfizer 
contends that, during the remainder of the district court 
proceedings, it may wish to engage, by means of the SBA, in a 
"public dialogue on the important issue of the safety of in-place 
asbestos contaminating building products,"10 and Pfizer would 
suffer irreparable harm if it were deprived of the opportunity to 
engage in such constitutionally protected activity.  See Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality) ("The loss of First 
                     
10
.  See Pet.'s Br. at 25.  At oral argument, Pfizer stated that 
it feared that any further contributions to or association with 
the SBA might be admissible at trial, under the district court's 
ruling, as evidence of conspiracy or concerted action.  Pfizer 
also feared that its continued membership in various non-asbestos 
trade associations could render it potentially liable for 
anything these groups said or did. 
  
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.")  While the 
district court's ruling did not directly prohibit Pfizer from 
associating with the SBA during the remainder of the district 
court proceedings, there can be little question that in reality 
the district court ruling will powerfully inhibit Pfizer from 
doing so.  Under the court's reasoning, any further participation 
by Pfizer in SBA activities -- any contributions, any attendance 
at meetings, etc. -- would appear to constitute evidence of 
Pfizer's participation in an ongoing conspiracy or concert of 
action and thus be admissible at trial to prove such claims.  
Therefore, if Pfizer exercised its First Amendment rights in 
relation to the SBA, it would risk being held jointly and 
severally liable for all of the damages awarded against its 
codefendants.  In practical terms, the threat of such liability 
might well have a more powerful impact on an entity like Pfizer 
than the threat of civil contempt sanctions.  Yet if Pfizer had 
been ordered, on pain of civil contempt, to refrain from 
associating with the SBA during the pendency of the trial, the 
propriety of mandamus relief under Rodgers v. United States Steel 
Corp., supra, would be clear.  See also United States v. Bertoli, 
994 F.2d at 1015.  In prior cases, we have taken "a flexible 
approach to the propriety of reaching the merits of a non-final 
order on mandamus or prohibition in that the mere possibility of 
other methods of review does not absolutely bar consideration of 
the petition."  Id.  Here, the inhibiting effect of the district 
  
court's decision seems to us to be sufficient to justify the use 
of mandamus.    
 Although we held in Communication Workers Of America, 
AFL-CIO v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 932 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1991), 
that it is generally inappropriate to use mandamus as a vehicle 
for reviewing the denial of summary judgment, the present case is 
dramatically different.  In Communication Workers of America, we 
noted that by declining to issue a writ mandating the entry of 
summary judgment we did no more than require the petitioner to 
undergo a trial.  Id. at 210.  We believed that the expense of 
trial was not alone so consequential as to justify issuance of a 
writ because appellate review following final judgment was an 
adequate means to obtain relief.  Id.  As we have explained, 
however, the harm in the present case goes well beyond the mere 
expense and inconvenience of litigation.   Failure to issue a 
writ in this case would subject Pfizer to a continuing impairment 
of its First Amendment freedoms.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
two conditions that must be satisfied before a writ of mandamus 
can issue -- the petitioner's entitlement to relief must be clear 
and indisputable and the petitioner must have no other adequate 
remedy -- are satisfied here.  
 
V. 
 We recognize that even if a case satisfies these two 
conditions, the issuance of a writ of mandamus is not always 
required.  As the Supreme Court noted in Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403, 
"it is important to remember that issuance of the writ is in 
  
large part a matter of discretion with the court to which the 
petition is addressed."  In this case, we think that the issuance 
of the writ is appropriate, not only because Pfizer has satisfied 
the Kerr prerequisites, but also because of the special nature of 
this case.  The district court's ruling unquestionably involves 
"important" issues, see In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 
773, and is squarely contrary to Supreme Court precedent.  
Moreover, the extraordinary size and complexity of this class 
action -- factors that diminish the utility of appellate review 
following final judgment -- must be taken into account.  See id.   
As we have observed, mandamus is a safety valve in the final-
judgment rule, and some flexibility is required in its 
application.  Id. at 774.  Furthermore, we have some concern that 
requiring Pfizer to stand trial for civil conspiracy and concert 
of action predicated solely on its exercise of its First 
Amendment freedoms could generally chill the exercise of the 
freedom of association by those who wish to contribute to, attend 
the meetings of, and otherwise associate with trade groups and 
other organizations that engage in public advocacy and debate.  
An amicus (which represents executives who manage thousands of 
business, professional, educational, technical, and trade 
associations, professional societies and other nonprofit 
organizations) has argued that the district court's decision may 
have such an effect.  See Br. for Amicus American Society of 
Association Executives at 1-2, 5.  While we do not want to 
overestimate the likely impact of a single, interlocutory 
  
district court decision, we do not think that the amicus's 
concern is wholly unfounded. 
 In light of the circumstances that we have described, 
and because we find that Pfizer has a clear and indisputable 
right to relief that cannot be effectively vindicated by any 
other means, we hold that mandamus is a proper remedy in this 
case.     
 
VI. 
   For the reasons stated above, we grant Pfizer's 
petition for a writ of mandamus; we vacate the district court's 
order denying Pfizer's motion for partial summary judgment; and  
  
we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
Please see the Dissent, filed by Judge Walter K. Stapleton,Jr. 
this date, which will be listed and printed in separate form. 
